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Many revenue management (RM) industries are characterized by (a) ¯xed capacities in the
short term (e.g., hotel rooms, seats on an airline °ight), (b) homogeneous products (e.g., two
airline °ights between the same cities at similar times), and (c) customer purchasing decisions
largely in°uenced by price. Competition in these industries is also very high even with just two
or three direct competitors in a market. However, RM competition is not well understood and
practically all known implementations of RM software and most published models of RM do
not explicitly model competition. For this reason, there has been considerable recent interest
and research activity to understand RM competition. In this paper we study price competition
for an oligopoly in a dynamic setting, where each of the sellers has a ¯xed number of units
available for sale over a ¯xed number of periods. Demand is stochastic, and depending on how
it evolves, sellers may change their prices at any time. This re°ects the fact that ¯rms constantly,
and almost costlessly, change their prices (alternately, allocations at a price in quantity-based
RM), reacting either to updates in their estimates of market demand, competitor prices, or
inventory levels. We ¯rst prove existence of a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium for a duopoly.
In equilibrium, in each state sellers engage in Bertrand competition, so that the seller with
the lowest reservation value ends up selling a unit at a price that is equal to the equilibrium
reservation value of the competitor. This structure hence extends the marginal-value concept
of bid-price control, used in many RM implementations, to a competitive model. In addition,
we show that the seller with the lowest capacity sells all its units ¯rst. Furthermore, we extend
the results transparently to n ¯rms and perform a number of numerical comparative statics
exploiting the uniqueness of the subgame-perfect equilibrium.
Keywords: revenue management, bid-prices, subgame-perfect equilibrium.
1 Introduction
Revenue management (RM) is the control of the sale of a limited quantity of a resource (hotel rooms
for a night, airline seats, advertising slots etc.) to a potential set of customers (the market). The
resource is perishable, and for the sake of simplicity, we assume that it perishes at a ¯xed point
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1of time in the future. Customers are independent of each other, arrive randomly during the sale
period, and demand one unit of resource each. Sale is online, so ¯rms have to set their prices at the
time of each customer's arrival. The reader should consult the books by Talluri and van Ryzin [34]
or Phillips [32] for a background on the theory and a survey of applications of revenue management.
While a signi¯cant body of research in RM has been developed over the last decade, much of
it is concerned with a better modeling of customer behavior (discrete-choice modeling of demand,
strategic customers, etc.) or in jointly optimizing multiple resources (network revenue management).
In contrast, the literature that studies the role of competition in revenue management has been
relatively sparse. Part of the reason could be that when one adds capacity constraints, even relatively
simple models such as the Bertrand-Edgeworth model lack pure-strategy equilibria making them
di±cult to extend to more complicated RM situations (Netessine and Shumsky[29]).
In contrast to the negative results and di±culties associated with the Bertrand-Edgeworth model
of competition, Dudey [13], somewhat surprisingly, shows that the dynamic version of Bertrand-
Edgeworth duopoly competition with a known and ¯xed market size has a unique subgame-perfect
equilibrium. The work of Dudey [13] has some bearing on RM as (i) in many RM situations, such
as an airline market served by low-cost carriers, price is the main consideration for customers and
there is very little brand or product di®erentiation, (ii) a dynamic model of competition re°ects
operational RM price-setting behavior better, and (iii) it holds the promise that by modeling the
dynamics of competition one can obtain better predictions of equilibrium behavior and thereby get
some managerial insight into the nature of RM competition. It therefore appears to be the right
starting point to study competition in RM, with the objective of gradually relaxing some of the
assumptions of his model and make it more relevant to an operational problem such as RM.
In this paper we study a dynamic model of price competition between sellers who o®er an identical
resource with limited capacities and a stochastic market demand. Our model, while stylized and
simpli¯ed, is intended to re°ect the competitive considerations of a revenue manager at a hotel or
airline who sets prices daily for products that compete directly with another ¯rm. We generalize and
simplify Dudey's [13] results, showing that under a more general model, the equilibrium behavior of
a duopoly (that we later generalize to n ¯rms) can be characterized by a simple \competitive bid-
price" type of rule: each ¯rm calculates a competitive (equilibrium) reservation value, and in each
period, the ¯rm with the lower reservation value makes the sale at a price equal to the other ¯rm's
reservation value. This is the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium. This interpretation is appealing
for two reasons. First, showing that there is a unique equilibrium during the price-competition
phase allows us to study numerically a number of di±cult strategic questions, such as capacity
choice, overall market pro¯ts and market entry. Second, many RM systems use the concept of bid-
price control: they sell the resource at all prices higher than a threshold value that is a function
of remaining capacity and time. In that respect, our results show how competition in°uences the
bid-price.
Our results also highlight the critical role of capacity asymmetries in determining the degree of
competition and the pro¯ts obtained. When capacities are unequal, the lower-capacity ¯rm always
has a lower reservation value, sells ¯rst, and continues to sell until it exhausts capacity. The higher-
capacity ¯rm has no choice but to wait until the other ¯rm sells out and pro¯ts by charging monopoly
price for the residual demand. Nevertheless, its competitive presence forces the lower-capacity ¯rm
to price much lower than the monopoly price|even when both ¯rms know that the customers are
price-insensitive. The degree of pro¯ts will depend on the overall market size.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In x2 we review the relevant literature from eco-
nomics and operations management. We then present our model in x3, and in x4 the main analytical
2results, ¯rst for a duopoly and then to n ¯rms. In x5 we use the equilibrium characterization to study
numerically a number of interesting questions as to how pro¯ts change as a function of capacity and
market size. Finally in x6 we conclude with a summary of contribution and directions for future
research.
2 Literature Review
We divide the review into static and dynamic models of competition.
2.1 Static models
The two classic models of oligopoly are the Cournot model (competition in quantities [8]) and
the Bertrand model (competition in prices [4]). In the Cournot model, n ¯rms ¯rst choose their
production quantity simultaneously, and the market then determines the price that clears total
output. In the Bertrand model of price competition, ¯rms produce an identical commodity and
customers buy only from ¯rms o®ering the lowest price. Firms compete on price, and it is assumed
that each ¯rm produces a quantity su±cient to satisfy all the demand it faces at its o®ered price:
this results in a unique equilibrium in which ¯rms price at their marginal cost and make zero pro¯ts.
The Bertrand model can be thought of representing a sort of extreme competition, where the
product is essentially a \commodity" and price is the only factor in°uencing customer purchases. As
one can expect, the intensity of competition is less for di®erentiated products. There is a considerable
amount of literature on competition amongst di®erentiated products. Many of these models are
based on the discrete-choice model of customer purchases (speci¯cally logit, with a single customer
segment), with the product attributes marking di®erentiation and probabilities of purchase. The
main advantage of such models is that each ¯rm's pro¯t is pseudo-concave in its own price, leading
to a price-equilibrium (Anderson, Palma and Thisse [2]).
In this paper we are mainly concerned with Bertrand competition, but with capacity constraints.
This is commonly called the Bertrand-Edgeworth model (Edgeworth [14]). In this model, consumers
buy at the ¯rm with the lowest price and if two ¯rms have identical prices, they choose one at random.
They arrive in a random order, independent of their valuations. A pure-strategy equilibrium need
not exist in such a case. However, mixed-strategy equilibria exist ([1], [26], [9]); see Levitan and
Shubik [26] for a proof of this result and also for further details on the Bertrand, Cournot and the
Bertrand-Edgeworth models.
The equilibrium for the (static) Bertrand-Edgeworth competition game for n-¯rms with arbitrary
capacities is not well understood. Hirata [20] and De Francesco and Salvadori [11] are two recent
articles which characterize the mixed-strategy equilibria for tripolies. Hirata [20] ¯nds that the
smallest capacity ¯rm can earn the most pro¯ts per unit of capacity in equilibrium, a ¯nding that
can happen under some circumstances in our model.
The Bertrand-Edgeworth model seems the ideal starting point for exploring revenue management
competition. In most revenue management situations capacity is ¯xed in the short-term (such as
the number of hotel rooms, or airplane capacity), and the competition is usually based on price.
The lack of a pure-strategy equilibrium however is somewhat discouraging. If even the simplest
case gives no clear prediction as to what will happen in equilibrium, introducing more complicated
phenomenon such as multiple customer segments and capacity choice would not make the analysis
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With a speci¯c RM situation in mind, Netessine and Shumsky [29] study the Bertrand-Edgeworth
model with two customer types in a duopoly. Both ¯rms have a ¯xed capacity but sell in two classes,
denoted H (high) and L (low). Each ¯rm o®ers identical prices pL < pH (¯xed exogenously).
Customers substitute among airlines within the same class, and the strategic decisions are how
much of the capacity to allocate to class L. They show that there is no equilibrium in general and
give su±cient conditions on the demand distributions (total positivity) for guaranteeing one. In an
equilibrium they show that more seats are protected for higher-fare customers than in a monopoly.
In a similar vein, Zhao [35] and Li et al. [27] consider static RM competition with two customer
classes. Zhao [35] considers a two-stage model where prices for two classes are set ¯rst and then
the ¯rms set allocations for the two classes. Under a spill-over model, di®erent from that of [29], he
shows that both price and protection levels are lower when the ¯rms compete on prices as well as
allocations. Li et al. [27] consider a model similar to [29] but with cost asymmetries and a di®erent
spill model. They establish su±cient conditions for a unique pure-strategy equilibrium, and obtain
a result similar to that of Zhao [35] on allocations for the higher-fare customers.
For reasons of brevity, we leave out the vast literature on Cournot competition, except to mention
the work that considers a two-stage game where ¯rms ¯rst set capacities (Cournot) and then in the
second-stage set prices (Bertrand). The interest in this model increased considerably after Kreps
and Scheinkman [23] showed that the two-stage game has a unique equilibrium that coincides with
the Cournot outcome, thus validating the Cournot model. However, note that both stages of the
game are static, and in such models one has to de¯ne how demand °ows between the two ¯rms.
Kreps and Scheinkman [23] use a form called e±cient rationing (highest valuation customers served
¯rst), whereas Davidson and Deneckere [10] show that the result does not hold if one considers an
alternate proportional rationing scheme (akin to random assignment). We mention these results
because in the numerical results of x5.4 we investigate a ¯rm's capacity choice in a two-stage game
where in the ¯rst stage ¯rms choose capacity, and then compete setting dynamic prices.
2.2 Dynamic models of competition
Chamberlin [6] was one of the ¯rst economists to point out that repeated interaction between
oligopolists can facilitate collusion. With repeated interactions ¯rms can threaten retaliation (price
wars) and thus ensure that competitors do not deviate from collusive prices.
One of the earliest papers studying dynamic price competition with capacity constraints is
Dudey [13] who showed the existence of a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium, in contrast to the
classical non-existence result of Edgeworth. The value of showing uniqueness of the equilibrium can-
not be underestimated. To quote Osborne and Pitchuk [30], \...(non-uniqueness) causes problems
in economic applications, since without a uniqueness result we do not know if the characteristics
of a particular equilibrium are shared by others, and we cannot legitimately perform comparative
static exercises."
In general it is di±cult to prove the existence of subgame-perfect equilibria in a (¯nite) multi-
period stochastic game, and there are very few general results to aid such proof, so we believe
Dudey [13] should be the right base for investigating dynamic RM competition. Firms charge prices
other than the valuations|zero or even negative prices|for purely competitive reasons rather than
for price discrimination, highlighting the havoc pure competition can play with prices.
Biglaiser and Vettas [5] study a dynamic price game where the ¯rms have ¯xed, limited capacities
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rium, and seller's market shares tend to by maximally asymmetric with high probability (somewhat
re°ected by our results also). In a model very relevant to RM, and like ours based to a good extent
on Dudey [13], Anderson and Schneider [3] study dynamic price competition. Their main emphasis
is the role of search costs on the equilibrium output and surprisingly they show that when search
costs are present duopoly prices are higher than charged by a monopolist.
In the operations research/management literature, notable works closest to our research are
Perakis and Sood [31] and Gallego and Hu [17]. Perakis and Sood [31] study an open-loop equilibrium
(prices are ¯xed for the entire horizon, and the prices need not be subgame-perfect) using variational
inequality tools and perform comparative statics on equilibrium prices as a function of demand-
capacity ratios. Gallego and Hu [17] study a stochastic di®erential game of duopoly competition
and give su±cient conditions for the existence of open-loop and closed-loop Nash equilibria. Their
aim is to develop e±cient pricing heuristics predicted by these equilibrium paths.
Finally, there is a fairly large body of work on dynamic versions of di®erentiated-product price
competition. Some sample publications that extend the discrete choice one-period models considered
in ([2])are: in economics, [28], marketing, [7], and operations [18], [25],[33]. Talluri [33] points out the
role of observability in a dynamic capacity RM allocation control game. While the concept of Nash
equilibrium is independent of observability of the strategy parameters, it is still unsatisfactory to
model best-response functions that assume the players can observe the competitor's capacity, when
in reality one cannot. The role of unobservability is an interesting research problem for operational
applications, that we believe deserves more attention.
3 The Duopoly Model
We consider two ¯rms A and B that have a number of units to be sold before a deadline. We denote
by x0A and x0B respectively the capacities available initially (at time 0). One can think of these
capacities as the number of seats on a °ight that can be sold before departure. We initially assume
that the variable (marginal) cost of selling a unit is zero, but this is relaxed in x4.4. Although we
focus on the case of two ¯rms, the model and the results are extended to n > 2 ¯rms in x4.5.
A number of customers would like to buy the units sold by the two ¯rms. These customers value
the product at a common ¯xed value v > 0 (the relaxation of this assumption is discussed in x4.4).
The customers arrive sequentially to the market, and demand exactly one unit. When a customer
arrives, each seller quotes a price, and the customer purchases the unit from the lowest-price ¯rm,
provided that the price is less than her valuation v. If the two ¯rms o®er the same price below v
then the customer chooses one randomly with probability 0:5. For example, in the airline industry,
it is common that when a customer receives two quotes for two identical °ights of two airlines
from an internet travel agent, she is indi®erent about the airline brand. Finally, a customer who
cannot purchase because prices are higher than her valuation leaves the system|that is, she does
not try again. In that sense, we are assuming that customers are not strategic|their arrival time is
determined by nature.
We are interested in the pricing policies that the sellers will set, under competition, for the
stochastic pool of customers.
53.1 Modeling the Demand Process
As in most practical cases, the total number of customers interested in the product is unknown to
the sellers. In order to model the information available to the sellers, we consider a ¯nite number
of periods in which sales can occur, t = 0;:::;T. In each period, both sellers observe whether one
or zero customers arrive. With this information, and possibly other external information (such as
macroeconomic changes that a®ect the arrival distribution), the sellers update their information for
the next period.
Formally, we denote It the information available to both sellers at the beginning of period t. For
simplicity, we assume that It can take a ¯nite number of values, in the set St. We denote as ~ SIt the
random variable equal to one if a customer arrives at t and zero otherwise. Let ~ RIt be the remaining
number of customers from period t until T. Both ¯rms have the same available information, and
we assume they share the same forecast on the distribution of ~ RIt. We denote FIt the cumulative
distribution function (c.d.f.) of ~ RIt, i.e., FIt(x) = Pr[ ~ RIt · x], and ¹ FIt ´ 1 ¡ FIt. We make no
distributional assumptions on ~ RIt, except that for all t;It, it is bounded above by T ¡ t + 1, the
number of periods to go, i.e., FIt(T ¡ t + 1) = 1 (which is reasonable since T can be set as high
as needed). Note that one can specify any distribution for ~ RIt, which allows the ¯rms to ¯t the
variance in the observed data.
The evolution of the information might be random. Speci¯cally, we can de¯ne a transition
probability from any state It 2 St to It+1 2 St+1.This model is quite °exible and allows modeling
correlated demand processes. In particular, it captures some common models from the literature,
as shown through the two examples below. As we mentioned earlier, both ¯rms have the same
information and they know that the competitor also has access to the same information.
Poisson demand process. One simple case captured by the model is the case of arrivals that
are independent over time. Denote as ¸t 2 [0;1] as the probability that a customer arrives at
t, independent of past arrivals. In this case, the only information that the sellers need to know
to forecast future arrivals, It, only takes one value: (¸t;:::;¸T). The transitions in this case
are deterministic, i.e., we move from (¸t;:::;¸T) to (¸t+1;:::;¸T) with probability one. One
can see that as one chooses a ¯ner discretization of the selling period, i.e., T ! 1, this demand
process can model a non-homogeneous Poisson process, as in Gallego and van Ryzin [19].
Uncertain market size. One other application of the general demand model is the case
where all the relevant information is contained in the number of past arrivals. In other words,
all the uncertainty is contained in ~ M · T + 1 the random variable that determines the total,
potential, market size. When ~ M is deterministic, the model coincides with the one studied in
Dudey [13] and Anderson and Schneider [3]. If ~ M is non-deterministic, as customers arrive,
the distribution of ~ M can be updated as new customers arrive. Speci¯cally, the information It
is the knowledge of whether more customers will arrive or not (given by how many customers
have arrived until now). In particular, It = (t;Y ) if more customers may arrive, and It = (t;N)
otherwise. Initially, I0 = (0;Y ), and the c.d.f. of ~ M = ~ RI0 is the prior distribution of the market
size, denoted G ~ M. In every period t, a customer arrives if and only if ~ M > t. Hence, at t, if
It = (t;Y ), t customers have arrived. Hence, the distribution of ~ RIt = ~ M ¡ t, depends on the
conditional distribution of ~ M given that t customers have arrived. The conditional distribution
of ~ RIt is given by Gt, de¯ned recursively by
Gt(x) = Pr[ ~ RIt · xj ~ M ¸ t] =
G ~ M(t + x) ¡ G ~ M(t ¡ 1)
1 ¡ G ~ M(t ¡ 1)
; for all x ¸ 0:
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which case ~ RIt = 0 with probability one. In this model, St = f(t;Y );(t;N)g and the transition
probabilities are: from (t;N) to (t+1;N), 1; from (t;N) to (t+1;Y ), 0; from (t;Y ) to (t+1;N),
G ~ M(t) ¡ G ~ M(t ¡ 1)
1 ¡ G ~ M(t ¡ 1)
; and from (t;Y ) to (t + 1;Y ),
1 ¡ G ~ M(t)
1 ¡ G ~ M(t ¡ 1)
.
3.2 Revenue Management with Bid-Prices
In each period, each seller prices its capacity dynamically. In order to set this price, it can use the
information on:
² future demand, available at t, It;
² its own capacity, denoted xt;A (xt;B);
² the competitor's capacity xt;B (xt;A).
Thus, we assume that each seller can observe the capacity of the competitor. Similarly, we assume
that both ¯rms see all customer arrivals and their purchases. While these assumptions on observ-
ability are standard in game theory and Economics, in x5.2 we point out how this information can
in fact be deduced from the equilibrium price path.
Given current information It and capacities of the ¯rms are xt;A;xt;B, ¯rms simultaneously set
prices pt;A;pt;B. If xt;A = 0 (xt;B = 0), we assume that pt;A = v+1 (pt;B = v+1), the quoted price
of ¯rm A (respectively B) is high enough to reject customers if there is no capacity left.
If a customer arrives in a period, she purchases a unit at the lowest-price ¯rm, provided that
the quoted price is lower than her reservation value v. Hence, given the prices, we can de¯ne the





1 if pt;A < pt;B and pt;A · v
0:5 if pt;A = pt;B
0 otherwise
PB(pt;A;pt;B) is de¯ned identically.
Given current capacities xt;A,xt;B and current information It, a ¯rm's objective is to maximize
its revenue-to-go. In other words, a ¯rm will set the price that maximizes the revenue from selling
its capacity over the remaining sale period. Since the ¯rm is facing competition, its pricing strategy
will depend on the competitor's price strategy. We thus require game-theoretical tools to solve the
problem. Speci¯cally, we are interested in ¯nding equilibrium price strategies, i.e., a set of price
policies fpA;pBg := fpt;A(xt;A;xt;B;It);pt;B(xt;A;xt;B;It)g from which no ¯rm has a unilateral
incentive to deviate. Since the decisions can be modi¯ed in each period, these strategies will have
to be subgame-perfect. A subgame-perfect equilibrium is one in which the equilibrium is simultane-
ously a Nash equilibrium for every subgame (the game from any subsequent stage assuming all the
information on actions from the previous stages) of the initial game. See Fudenberg and Tirole [15]
for a formal de¯nition in terms of the extensive-form of a game.
We illustrate the concept using an example in the pricing context. Consider a T period,
two-player (denoted A;B), Bertrand pricing game where prices are the strategic variables. Then
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all t;1 < t · T, the decisions [(pt;A;pt;B);:::;(pT;A;pT;B)] form a Nash equilibrium for the subgame
starting from period t to period T.
Subgame-perfect equilibria are sometimes also referred to as closed-loop equilibria or equilibria
with feedback.
3.3 Static and Open-loop Strategies
While the non-existence of equilibrium for the Bertrand-Edgeworth model (the Edgeworth cycle) is
well known, we recall it here for completeness and to contrast with the dynamic game. Consider a
duopoly with both ¯rms having two units of capacity each and three customers each with valuation
of 1 over three periods, known to both ¯rms. So assume one of the ¯rms, say A, sets price pA · pB
in equilibrium. For ¯rm B not to undercut ¯rm A, it must be true that 2pA · pB (in which case,
its best price is pB = 1). Meanwhile, ¯rm A is better o® pricing just below pB. Hence, there can be
no equilibrium.
Alternatively, one can look for an open-loop equilibrium using dynamic prices. Open-loop equilib-
rium (or non-feedback equilibrium) is an equilibrium concept sometimes applied in dynamic pricing
models of competition (for instance, see [17] or [31]). Competing ¯rms solve a single optimization
problem at the beginning to set prices over the entire pricing horizon, rather than solve a dynamic
program that sets policies based on current time and inventories. As mathematical programs are
somewhat easier to analyze than dynamic programs, studying open-loop equilibria tends to be more
tractable. Of course, it needs a somewhat strong assumption that ¯rms commit to the prices that
they set in the beginning.
In the Bertrand-Edgeworth model, even with our simple model of known valuations, open-
loop equilibria may fail to exist. In the above example, the ¯rms set prices fp1;A;p2;A;p3;Ag and
fp1;B;p2;B;p3;Bg, for each of the three periods. Using the indicator function 1[E] to denote 1 if event
E occurs and 0 otherwise, and the operator _ to represent \or", and ^ to represent \and", expected
revenue for ¯rm 1 is then
p1;A(1[p1;A<p1;B] + 0:51[p1;A=p1;B]) + p2;A(1[p2;A<p2;B] + 0:51[p2;A=p2;B])
+p3;A(1[p3;A<p3;B] + 0:51[p3;A=p3;B])1[x3;A>0]
where 1[x3;A>0] = 1[(p1;A>p1;B)_(p2;A>p2;B)] + 0:751[(p1;A=p1;B)^(p2;A=p2;B)].
If p3;A > p3;B and ¯rm A is not sold out, it always has an incentive to undercut B unless p3;B = 0.
Otherwise, A has a zero probability of having capacity left in period 3 (p1;A < p1;B and p2;A < p2;B).
But if either p1;A or p2;A are greater than 0, ¯rm B is better o® undercutting ¯rm A in that period.
So, in any equilibrium either p1;A = p2;A = 0 or p3;B = 0. But if p1;A = p2;A = 0 ¯rm B is better
o® pricing p3;B = 1 in which case ¯rm A would not price p1;A = p2;A = 0 as it is better o® to reach
period 3 with positive capacity.
Next, p3;A = p3;B can be an equilibrium only if there is a positive probability of arriving with
positive capacity at stage 3 for both ¯rms, in which case p3;A = p3;B = 0, as otherwise each
has an incentive to undercut the other. Furthermore, if in either period 1 or 2, say period 1,
0 < p1;A < p1;B, ¯rm B then is better o® undercutting A in that period, so we should have
p1;A = p1;B = p2;A = p2;B = 0, but then ¯rm B (or A) is better o® pricing at 1 in all three periods.
Hence, no open-loop equilibrium exists.
Thus, in this example, both the static and open-loop models are not capable of generating enough
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3.4 Subgame-perfect Strategies
In contrast with static and open-loop strategies, closed-loop (i.e., subgame-perfect) policies, are the
most natural type of policies in a dynamic price-setting game when ¯rms can freely adjust prices to
the current state of the system (current capacities, current information).
In equilibrium, each ¯rm's price policy is the best-response to the competitor's policy. Consider
the decision of ¯rm A, at time t. To simplify the exposition, we remove the index t from the state
and decision variables whenever it is clear from the context (for instance conditioned on It indicates
the state and decision variables are for period t). Let ¯rm A have remnant capacity of xA units, the
competitor, xB units left, and the current state of the market be It. Given a competitor's pricing
strategy pB for all states I and capacities xA;xB, the ¯rm needs to determine a best-response pricing
pA for all states It and capacities xA;xB.
Since we are considering a multi-period price-setting game, denote, if it exists and is well-de¯ned,
which we shall prove shortly, V ¦
A(xA;xB;It+1) the equilibrium value function for future periods (with
information state It+1, given capacities are xA,xB. The superscript ¦ shall represent the unique
subgame-perfect equilibrium from now on, provided of course we have shown that such is the case.
In contrast, we use the superscript ¤ to represent a ¯rm's optimal best-response value.
Let V ¤
A(pB;xA;xB;It) be the best-response value function of A to price pB o®ered by ¯rm B in
the state (xA;xB;It). Since pB is given, in the current period ¯rm B will quote pB = pB(xA;xB;It).
V ¤
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V ¦
A(xA ¡ 1;xB; ~ It+1)
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with the boundary condition V ¦




¯It; ~ SIt = k
i
,
with k = 0;1, denotes the conditional expectation with respect to ~ It+1 given that the current state
is It and ~ SIt = k. We can formulate the best-response value function for ¯rm B in a similar way.
If the best-responses of A and B solving (1) leads to a unique pure-strategy equilibrium (which
we show later) in all scenarios of information and capacities, we can substitute V ¦(¢) for V ¤(¢), and
proceed to period t ¡ 1.
94 Equilibrium Behavior
4.1 Equilibrium Characterization for a duopoly
In this section, we show the existence of a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium in pure strategies for
a duopoly. This is in contrast to the Bertrand-Edgeworth model of price-competition with capacity
constraints where a pure strategy equilibrium need not exist. We characterize the equilibrium, which
has a simple marginal-value interpretation. For this purpose, we examine the equilibrium conditions
backwards, from all information states IT 2 ST ¯rst, then IT¡1 2 ST¡1 and so on until I1 2 S1.
At t = T, given state IT, at most one more customer may arrive. If xA = xB = 0, both ¯rms
are stocked out, so that both quotes are v + 1, and if a customer arrives, it cannot be served. If
xA > 0;xB = 0, ¯rm B is stocked out, and hence ¯rm A will quote pA(xA;0;IT) = v and sell a unit
if a customer arrives. Similarly, if xB > 0;xA = 0, pB(0;xB;IT) = v. Finally, if xA > 0;xB > 0, for
any pB, consider A's decision, given by (1):
max
pA
Pr(~ SIT = 1jIT)PA(pA;pB)pA:
It is clear that, at optimality, pA should be slightly lower than pB and at most v. This is symmetric
Bertrand competition with zero variable cost. Thus, in the last period, in this scenario xA > 0;xB >
0, equilibrium exists, is unique, so that pA = pB = 0.
As a result, under a subgame-perfect equilibrium strategy, necessarily V ¦
A(xA;xB;IT) = 0 if
xA > 0 and xB > 0, or xA = 0, and V ¦
A(xA;xB;It) = vPr(~ SIT = 1) if xA > 0 and xB = 0. As a
result, we can analyze equilibrium conditions at IT¡1.
At t = T ¡ 1, given a state IT¡1, if xA = xB = 0, both ¯rms are stocked out, so that both
quotes are v +1. If xA > 0;xB = 0, ¯rm B is stocked out and ¯rm A will quote pA(xA;0;IT¡1) = v
and sell a unit to any new customer. Similarly, if xB > 0;xA = 0, pB(0;xB;IT¡1) = v. Finally, if
xA;xB > 0, for any pB, A's decision in (1) is slightly more di±cult than for the previous period, T:
max
pA




pA + E~ IT
h
V ¦
A(xA ¡ 1;xB; ~ IT)
¯ ¯





A(xA;xB ¡ 1; ~ IT)
¯
¯











¯IT¡1; ~ SIT¡1 = 1
io





¯IT¡1; ~ SIT¡1 = 0
i
All the terms with V ¦
A(xA;xB; ~ IT) are zero when xA;xB > 0, as determined above. If xB = 1, the
expression above can be written as
max
pA
Pr(~ SIT¡1 = 1jIT¡1)
¡
PA(pA;pB)pA + PB(pA;pB)E~ ITvPr(~ S~ IT = 1jIT¡1; ~ SIT¡1 = 1)
¢
The optimal policy is to set pA slightly lower than pB (and at most v) if pB > vPr
³
~ S~ IT =
1jIT¡1; ~ SIT¡1 = 1
´
, and higher than pB otherwise. In other words, ¯rm A has in this case a
reservation value of vPr
³
~ S~ IT = 1jIT¡1; ~ SIT¡1 = 1
´
below which it is not willing to set its price.
10Hence, it will engage in a price war, i.e., Bertrand competition, until the reservation price is reached.
If the competitor posts a price below that, it will let the customer go.
On the other hand, if xB ¸ 2, A's decision is
max
pA




and hence the same logic applies with a reservation price of zero.
Since ¯rm B's decision has exactly the same structure, any subgame-perfect equilibrium again
takes the form of Bertrand competition with a reservation price for each seller, that depends on
the existing capacity levels. As before, the best-response value function determined in Equation
(1) is well de¯ned for IT¡2. The same procedure can be continued for lower t. To do this, we




A(xA;xB;It) := V ¤
A(p¦
B;xA;xB;It) and V ¦
B(xA;xB;It) := V ¤
B(p¦
A;xA;xB;It). With this notation,
we can characterize the structure of any pricing equilibrium.
Lemma 1. For a duopoly, for all t;It, in any subgame-perfect equilibrium, if xA > 0;xB > 0, sellers
engage in an asymmetric Bertrand price competition with reservation prices minf4V ¦
A(xA;xB;It);vg
for A and minf4V ¦
B(xA;xB;It);vg for B, where if xA;xB > 0
4V ¦
A(xA;xB;It) = E~ It+1
h
V ¦
A(xA;xB ¡ 1; ~ It+1) ¡ V ¦
A(xA ¡ 1;xB; ~ It+1)
¯




B(xA;xB;It) = E~ It+1
h
V ¦
B(xA ¡ 1;xB; ~ It+1) ¡ V ¦
B(xA;xB ¡ 1; ~ It+1)
¯
¯




A(xA;0;It) = 4V ¦
B(0;xB;It) = 1: As a result, in equilibrium, if a customer arrives, the
seller with the lowest reservation price sells a unit, at the reservation price of the competitor. If
the reservation prices are equal, each one sells a unit with probability 0:5. Moreover, if xA = 0 or
xB = 0, the supplier with positive capacity sells a unit at a price v.
As a result of the lemma, the value functions V ¦
A and V ¦
B can be de¯ned through a joint recursion.
This is presented in the following lemma.
Lemma 2. The value function of an equilibrium for the duopoly is given by the joint recursion
V ¦
A(¢;¢;IT+1) = V ¦





> > > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > :
0 if xA = 0
Pr(~ SIt = 1jIt)
³
v + E~ It+1
h
V ¦
A(xA ¡ 1;0; ~ It+1)
¯ ¯
¯It; ~ SIt = 1
i´






¯It; ~ SIt = 0
i
if xA > 0;xB = 0





A(xA ¡ 1;xB; ~ It+1)
¯
¯





















> > > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > :
0 if xB = 0
Pr(~ SIt = 1jIt)
³
v + E~ It+1
h
V ¦
A(0;xB ¡ 1; ~ It+1)
¯ ¯
¯It; ~ SIt = 1
i´






¯It; ~ SIt = 0
i
if xB > 0;xA = 0





B(xA;xB ¡ 1; ~ It+1)
¯
¯

















A(xA;xB;It) and 4V ¦
B(xA;xB;It) are de¯ned in Equations (2) and (3).
Joining Lemmas 1 and 2, we ¯nd that the subgame-perfect equilibrium exists, and must be
unique.
Theorem 1. There exists a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium of the pricing game.
Thus, we characterize the equilibrium prices combining Equations (2) to (5). We can exploit the
fact that the recursion is given explicitly, to show some interesting properties of the equilibrium.
Moreover, such an equilibrium has an intuitive explanation: the ¯rm with the lower reservation
value always sells at a price that is at most the other ¯rm's reservation value. The concept of a
bid-price control is well established and widely used in implementations but usually calculated in
a monopoly model|the idea is that the marginal value (at current capacity) sets a price threshold
value, above which sales are \admitted", and below which they are \rejected". As the competitive
parallel to this, Theorem 1 shows that under competition, a ¯rm should set a bid-price equal to the
maximum of its own reservation value and the competitor's reservation value.
4.2 Equilibrium Prices and Pro¯ts
Since the sellers are symmetric, the value functions are such that V ¦
A(x;y;It) = V ¦
B(y;x;It), for all
x;y. As a result, we can simplify the recursion into a single-dimensional recursion.
Lemma 3. For all xA;xB;It, V ¦
A(xA;xB;It) = W(xA;xB;It) and V ¦
B(xA;xB;It) = W(xB;xA;It),
where W(¢;¢;IT+1) = 0 and for t · T, for all It, x;y,
1. W(x;y;It) = ¡1 if x < 0 or y < 0
2. W(0;y;It) = 0
3. for x > 0;y = 0,
W(x;0;It)
= Pr(~ SIt = 1jIt)
³
v + E~ It+1[W(x ¡ 1;0; ~ It+1)jIt; ~ SIt = 1]
´
+Pr(~ SIt = 0jIt)E~ It+1[W(x;0; ~ It+1)jIt; ~ SIt = 0]
(6)
124. for x > 0;y > 0,
W(x;y;It)
= Pr(~ SIt = 1jIt)
£max
(
E~ It+1[W(x;y ¡ 1; ~ It+1)jIt; ~ SIt = 1];
E~ It+1[W(y;x ¡ 1; ~ It+1) ¡ W(y ¡ 1;x; ~ It+1) + W(x ¡ 1;y; ~ It+1)jIt; ~ SIt = 1]
)
+Pr(~ SIt = 0jIt)E~ It+1[W(x;y; ~ It+1)jIt; ~ SIt = 0]
(7)
This formulation can in fact be solved in closed-form.
Lemma 4. For all It, if x < y,
W(x;y;It) = vxPr
h
~ RIt ¸ x + 1
i







~ RIt ¡ x
´+¾¸
where a+ = maxfa;0g.
One of the implications of the lemma is that if xA · xB, 4V ¦
A(xA;xB;It) · 4V ¦
B(xA;xB;It).
As a result, the seller with the lowest capacity has the lowest reservation price, and makes the sale if
a new customer arrives. This allows us to establish explicitly the equilibrium prices, as we do next.
Theorem 2. For any It, if a new customer arrives, he receives a unit from the seller with the lowest
capacity, at a price
vPr
h
~ RIt+1 ¸ minfxA;xBg
¯
¯ ¯It; ~ SIt = 1
i









¯It; ~ SIt = 1
i
:
The theorem shows that prices depend on the capacity of the seller with fewer remaining units.
As a result, for a given industry capacity (sum of both ¯rms' capacities), the price is lowest when
both have the same amount (symmetric duopoly), in which case it may even be negative. It is
highest when one has all of it and the other none (monopoly, in which case, the price is v). Prices
also depend on the forecast of future demand, ~ RIt+1, and will be higher if demand is stochastically
higher.
Figure 1 illustrates the trajectory of equilibrium prices for one realization of demand (homoge-
neous over time with arrival probability of 0:05 per period). One observes that, when an arrival
occurs, the ¯rm with the lower remaining capacity is the one that sells to the customer. When that
occurs, the price posted in the next period increases with a jump, as capacity is depleted, and the
reservation values of the two ¯rms increase. Eventually, when the entire capacity of the player with
smaller capacity is sold out, the remaining ¯rm takes a monopoly position, and sets a price equal
to the customer valuation. In contrast, when no arrival occurs, the price progressively decreases, as
the time left before the end of the horizon gets shorter.
Note that, when capacities are equal, the theorem indicates that the equilibrium price might
be negative in some cases. This result is at ¯rst glance surprising, but is in fact perfectly rational.
































































Figure 1: Equilibrium prices for one realization of demand and corresponding trajectory of the
remaining capacity. A demand arrival occurs with probability µ = 0:05 in each period. The time
horizon is T = 100. We use v = 1.
Indeed, from Lemma 4 it is easy to see that W(x;x;It) · vxPr
h
~ RIt ¸ x+1
i
. Hence, if W(x;x;It) ·
v(x¡1)Pr
h
~ RIt ¸ x
i
too, a ¯rm prefers having x¡1 units of capacity, one less than the competitor.
In fact, the pricing dynamics under asymmetric capacities are such that the ¯rm with lower capacity
sells all its units before the ¯rm with higher capacity sells its ¯rst unit, so that the ¯rm with lower
capacity is in a more favorable position. Thus, ¯rms might be willing to pay for becoming the
lower-capacity player, which means quoting a negative price.
4.3 Relation to Dynamic Bertrand-Edgeworth Competition
The results above hold for general demand processes. One can consider in particular the uncertain
market size model, presented at the end of x3.1, where ~ RIt = maxf0; ~ M ¡tg. The prices of Theorem
2 thus become for xA 6= xB
vPr
h
~ M ¡ t ¡ 1 ¸ minfxA;xBg
¯
¯
¯ ~ M ¸ t
i










¯ ~ M ¸ t
¸
:
If ~ M = M is deterministic, one can set the number of selling periods T + 1 = M.
Our model thus can be seen as dynamic Bertrand-Edgeworth competition in a stochastic demand
setting. Our results hence allow to interpret Dudey [13]'s result as marginal value pricing. Dudey
14shows that there is a unique equilibrium to the ¯nite-stage, deterministic-demand game can best
be visualized in Figure 2. The state-space is the 2-dimensional vector of capacities, and at every
stage, depending on where this vector falls, the prices are set as shown in the ¯gure; the ¯gure is
given with respect to the initial market-size M, but the strategies at every period are based on the
demand-to-come at period t, which as demand is considered known, can be written as M ¡t. Dudey














Figure 2: Equilibrium prices at every stage in Dudey [13]. Prices are negative on the thick line.
Our model generalizes Dudey [13], as the prices in Figure 2 are special cases when M is de-
terministic: When minfxA;xBg ¸ M ¡ t (number of pending customers from t to T = M ¡ 1),
the price is zero (marginal cost). When minfxA;xBg < M ¡ t and xA 6= xB, then the price is
v. When M ¡ t > xA = xB > (M ¡ t)=2, then the price is v[1 ¡ 2x + (M ¡ t)]. Finally, when
xA = xB · (M ¡ t)=2, then the price is v. Similarly, our Lemma 4 generalizes Dudey's Proposition
2 characterizing equilibrium revenues.
4.4 Extension to Asymmetric Costs and Time-Varying Customer Valua-
tions
The results presented so far were proved using the fact that (i) the marginal cost of selling a unit
was zero; and that (ii) customer valuation was known and identically equal to v. Under these two
assumptions, Theorem 2 showed that the ¯rm with less capacity will always sell all of its units
¯rst and only then the other ¯rm will start selling its capacity. Clearly, the result relies heavily
15on these assumptions. Indeed, if the ¯rm with smaller capacity has a higher marginal cost than
its competitor, then it is unlikely that it will sell ¯rst when capacity is in excess of supply (since
a price war will drive prices to the bottom). Similarly, if the customer valuation is higher towards
the end of the horizon (customers arriving late are usually business passengers that are willing to
pay more than customers that arrive early), then again the ¯rm with less capacity might prefer to
save it for later customers and let the competitor sell ¯rst. In this section, we extend the analysis of
xx4.1-4.2 to include asymmetric costs and time-varying valuations. When valuations decrease over
time, Theorem 1 can be extended into Theorem 3. In contrast, when valuations increase, then it is
possible that no equilibrium exists, as shown through a counterexample in Theorem 4.
For this purpose, assume that the marginal costs are cA;cB for ¯rms A;B respectively. Also
assume that the valuation of a customer arriving at time t given the available information It is vIt.
Theorem 3. When marginal costs are cA;cB and customer valuation vIt decreases over time (i.e.,
for all sample paths, for all t, vIt ¸ vIt+1), then there exists a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium of
the pricing game.
Thus, existence and uniqueness of equilibrium is guaranteed in this more extended setting. Fur-
thermore, while deriving equilibrium prices analytically becomes quite challenging, some observa-
tions can be made about which ¯rm has a lower reservation value in each period. According to
Theorem 2, when cA = cB, the ¯rm with less capacity sells all of its capacity ¯rst. Figure 3 how this
observation changes with asymmetric costs, with cA = 0 and cB = 0;0:3;0:6. For every cost levels
(cA;cB), one can see that when xB is high enough, A sells ¯rst (top-left of the ¯gure); when it is
low enough, B sells ¯rst (bottom-right). The ¯gure shows the line that separates the two regions.
Again, we can see that the ¯rm with much lower capacity tends to sell ¯rst. In particular, when
cA = cB = 0, the border between the two regions is the diagonal. As cB increases, the border moves
downward, and the region where B sells ¯rst becomes smaller. This indicates that a ¯rm has lower
reservation value when either its marginal cost is lower, or its capacity level is low enough compared
to the competitor's.
In contrast, when valuations increase over time, then the structure of the results changes com-
pletely and more than one equilibrium exists.
Theorem 4. Consider the game with two periods (T = 1), vI0 = v 2 (0;1) and vI1 = 1, cA = cB =
0. Then there might be more than one subgame-perfect equilibrium in pure strategies.
As a result, the value functions cannot be de¯ned uniquely. This reveals that the variation of
valuations over time is critical to ensure that the competitive situation has a well-behaved structure.
This is analog to an observation of Davidson and Deneckere [10]: when customers with higher
valuations may come late in the sales season, then price competition between two ¯rms will only
have equilibria in mixed strategies.
4.5 Extension to n ¸ 2 competitors
One natural question arising from Lemma 1 is whether the competitive dynamics, where each ¯rm
has a reservation value below which it is not willing to price, are preserved when the number of ¯rms
is larger than two. Indeed, in the duopoly setting, competition occurs µ a la Bertrand, where price
is reduced until all ¯rms but one are willing to sell their capacities. This results in an equilibrium
price equal to the reservation value of the \loser", similarly to a second-price auction. We study
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Figure 3: Winning ¯rm as a function of capacities (xA;xB), with cA = 0, di®erent values of cB =
0;0:3;0:6 and vIt = 1 for all It. A demand arrival occurs with probability µ = 0:05 in each period.
The time horizon is T = 100.
next how the results can be extended when the number of competitors is equal to n ¸ 2. We denote
i = 1;:::;n each one of the ¯rms, instead of A and B.
In this case, the state is de¯ned as x = (x1;:::;xn), it becomes n-dimensional. De¯ne for all j,
ej the vector with all components equal to zero except component j which is equal to 1.
Given information state It, consider the pricing game for period t, assuming that value functions
V ¦
i (x;It+1) are well-de¯ned, i = 1;:::;n. Let us analyze the best-response of two ¯rms i and j.
Since again valuations are constant, equal to v, all ¯rms are willing at sell at v. To build intuition,
assume ¯rst that all ¯rms except j price higher than v. Let
Vi;j(It) := E~ It+1
h
V ¦
i (x ¡ ei; ~ It+1)
¯
¯ ¯It; ~ SIt = 1
i
(8)
Firm i will choose to undercut j's price, denoted p, if and only if
p + Vi;i ¸ Vi;j
Similarly, j will be willing to reduce its price below p if and only if
p + Vj;j ¸ Vj;i
Hence, if Vi;j ¡ Vi;i < Vj;i ¡ Vj;j then i will be able to price below j; if Vi;j ¡ Vi;i > Vj;i ¡ Vj;j, the
reverse will be true; ¯nally, if Vi;j ¡ Vi;i = Vj;i ¡ Vj;j both ¯rms will reach the same price and will
serve the customer with equal probability. More generally, when n players are active in this price
competition, if for all j 6= i, Vi;j ¡ Vi;i · Vj;i ¡ Vj;j, then i will o®er the lowest price and sell to the
customer. It turns out that such a relationship exists: if there is a unique ¯rm with capacity higher
17than its competitors, then such i is any of the remaining ¯rms; if there are two or more ¯rms with
the highest level of capacity, then i is one of these. This allows us to prove the general equilibrium
structure.
Theorem 5. When there are n ¯rms with capacities x, then there exists a unique subgame-perfect
equilibrium of the pricing game. The equilibrium can be described as follows. Let xmax = max
j
xj
and M = fijxi = xmaxg.
² If jMj = 1, then the equilibrium price is
vPr
2





¯ ¯It; ~ SIt = 1
3
5
and some ¯rm j 62 M sells to the customer.


















¯It; ~ SIt = 1
3
5
and a ¯rm i 2 M sells to the customer.
The theorem thus generalizes Theorem 2 to an oligopolistic industry structure. We observe that
again it is possible to ¯nd negative prices in equilibrium. This occurs when there are at least two
¯rms with the largest industry capacity. In that case, one of them o®ers a very low price in order
to exit the group of ¯rms with the largest capacity, which will sell last. In all other cases, when
the largest ¯rm is unique (jMj = 1), the smaller ¯rms sell their capacities ¯rst, at a price given by
the capacity of all players except the largest one. Hence, prices are independent on how capacity is
shared among small ¯rms, and is set by the reservation value of the largest ¯rm.
Since the structure of the equilibrium has been established, it is possible to compare the level of
pro¯ts in the industry for a given level of aggregate capacity. This is presented in the next theorem.














































Not surprisingly, the highest level of industry pro¯t is reached by the monopoly. This is intuitive,
because, by eliminating competition, a monopoly is able to set a price equal to v for the entire
horizon. At the other end of the spectrum, the lowest pro¯t is achieved by a completely fragmented
industry where all players have a capacity equal to one.
18Allen and Hellwig [1] study the behavior of Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibria for general demand
functions when there are n ¯rms and each ¯rm is small relative to the market as a whole (mixed
strategy equilibria are known to exist, as shown in [9]). Their main result is that as n ! 1 for ¯xed
capacities, the prices approach perfectly competitive prices almost surely. Our result in Theorem 6




tends to 0 whenever the demand is ¯xed and
n is made larger.
5 Implications of Dynamic Competition
The results derived until now fully characterize the equilibrium, for a duopoly and a general oligopoly.
While the model is simpli¯ed along certain dimensions (such as assuming ¯xed valuations), the ad-
vantage is that we obtain a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium in a game of multi-period competi-
tion. This allows us to explore a number of strategic issues surrounding price competition.
5.1 Prediction of Negative Prices
The model predicts negative prices (prices below the marginal cost, taken here to be zero). In
practice, many low-cost carriers price extremely low; Ryanair in Europe for instance, has o®ered
round-trip fares starting at $0.01 (not including taxes|Ryanair current web site shows many seats
at $5.00 all-inclusive, changed after a EU ruling on price announcements). If one supposes that the
airline plans to recover its ¯xed cost over all the passengers, then this is clearly below the average
cost per passenger.
However, often one does not see negative prices. This might be for a number of reasons.
1. Firms do not have equal capacities, cannot observe each other's capacities, or assign a very
low probability that they are the same.
2. Firms' marginal costs are not zero, and negative prices are then shifted up.
3. Firms' products are di®erentiated to some degree, either because of di®erent airports or dif-
ferent departure times.
4. More generally, any of the assumptions behind the model is violated, and either we do not
have an equilibrium any more, or a completely di®erent equilibrium appears.
5. The observational requirements of an equilibrium do not hold or ¯rms do not optimize given
the information. We elaborate further on this in the next section.
Of course, our model, similar to Bertrand's, studies an idealized model of competition in a
dynamic setting with stochastic market demand. While negative prices are odd, they are perfectly
rational|the same way that the Bertrand's paradox is odd but rational, and the Prisoner's dilemma
is suboptimal but logical.
5.2 Observational Requirements
In practice each ¯rm observes the (publicly posted) market price of the competitor but not the
competitor's current capacity. The ¯rms' best-response functions however are based on full infor-
19mation of the purchases and capacities. While the concept of equilibrium itself is independent of
such observability (the equilibrium can be thought of de¯ned for an omniscient third-party ) it calls
into question whether two ¯rms reacting to each other's strategy will ever be able to reach such an
equilibrium. We point out here, that even though one normally does not observe a customer pur-
chasing at the other ¯rm, whenever such a purchase occurs, the price spikes upwards momentarily
(see Figure 4). So the information, in our model with known valuations, is completely coded in the
price paths. So the ¯rm monitoring the market price, knows precisely how many customers have
arrived and purchased at the competing ¯rm, and thereby infer, knowing the initial capacity, the
state of the competitor's capacity. Using the same observations, ¯rms can arrive at a joint forecast
quickly as the arrivals over a certain initial period can be used to forecast the rate accurately.
5.3 E®ect of Capacity Split and Market Size
Our model highlights that the ratio of capacities to market-size plays a critical role in the degree of
price competition and revenues obtained. To obtain some insight, we show some sample price-paths
in Figure 4, when the probability of an arrival per period is constant. The ¯gure illustrates price
and capacity paths for initial capacities (x0;A;x0;B) = (15;20) or (20;20), and expected demand
equal to 15 or 20 (i.e., the probability of an arrival per period is 0.15 and 0.2 respectively, since
there are 100 periods). There are two things to note about the price-paths. When the capacities are
not identical, and demand is moderately high, prices are relatively high and ¯rms make signi¯cant
pro¯ts, in contrast to the Bertrand's paradox. When capacities are identical, even if the demand
is higher than the combined capacity in the market, ¯rms compete ¯ercely initially to lower their
capacity and get the right to sell ¯rst and take less risk on their capacity. The equilibrium price is
hence negative in the beginning. In addition, when one of the ¯rms exhausts its capacity, then the
equilibrium price jumps up to the valuation of the customer, v = 1.
To capture better the insights from the sample paths, Figure 5 shows the starting market price at
time 0, as a function of the market demand (expected number of customers during the horizon) and
for di®erent share of capacity between the ¯rm, the total being ¯xed. Except for the degenerate case
of equal capacities, ¯rms set prices approaching collusive prices, especially when the market demand
is high compared to the total capacity. Figure 6 shows the total industry pro¯ts as a function of
market demand.
5.4 Capacity Choice and Entry Decisions
Lemma 4 characterizes the pro¯t of the ¯rm in equilibrium. Each ¯rm's pro¯t is non-monotonic in
its own capacity. More importantly, consider that there is an incumbent in the market with a ¯xed
capacity that it cannot change. A natural question is to determine the capacity choice for a new
entrant. Figure 7 shows a ¯rm's revenue at the best capacity point, given the incumbent's capacity.
One can see that one's best-response pro¯t is non-monotonic. This indicates that a ¯rm achieves
the highest pro¯t when the competitor either has a very small capacity, or a very large one. This
has important implications regarding the capacity game that ¯rms might play before entering into
the dynamic price competition phase.
Kreps and Scheinkman [23] conjecture that their results do not hold when there is uncertainty in
the aggregate demand. This subsequently has been investigated in a number of articles, but usually
only with a static second-stage pricing game, with some papers assuming demand is revealed prior to
























Sample price, capacity path with x
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Sample price, capacity path with x
0,A=20, x
0,B=20 and mean demand 15









































Sample price, capacity path with x
0,A=15, x
0,B=20 and mean demand 20







































Sample price, capacity path with x
0,A=20, x
0,B=20 and mean demand 20









































Sample price, capacity path with x
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Sample price, capacity path with x
0,A=20, x
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Figure 4: Sample price and inventory paths for two capacity combinations (15,20) and (20,20), and
demand equal to 15 (top) and 20 (middle). The bottowm ¯gures illustrate that prices can be low
when capacities are identical, even when total demand exceeds aggregate capacity.








































Figure 5: Initial prices as a function of market demand for di®erent values of capacities.









































Figure 6: Total industry pro¯ts as a function of market demand for di®erent ratios of capacities.
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Figure 7: Revenue and best capacity choice of an entrant, as a function of the incumbent's capacity.
the second stage game. Gal-Or [16] considers the case with inelastic demand (as we do in this paper)
with both demand and price set before demand realization. Hviid ([22], [21]) considers the problem
with uncertainty in the market-size before capacity choice that resolves during the pricing stage.
In Lepore [24] ¯rms observe demand after setting capacities. With a demand model quite similar
to ours, de Frutos and Fabra [12] consider price-inelastic demand with uncertain aggregate market
size and study the two-stage game under various scenarios of demand realization. The conclusion
in all these papers is either the model lacks a pure-strategy equilibrium or that in equilibrium the
¯rst-stage capacities can potentially be far from the Cournot outcomes. Osborne and Pitchuk [30]
study a duopoly with an adversarial rationing rule and characterize regions of the capacity space
with pure or mixed-strategy equilibria. They ¯nd that the equilibrium prices are lower the smaller
the demand compared to capacity. Osborne and Pitchuk [30] on the other hand con¯rm, under
their adversarial rationing, and a more general demand model, that the capacity choice coincides
with Cournot predictions. Allen and Hellwig [1] study the same problem, and likewise ¯nd mixed
strategy equilibria and show that duopoly prices never exceed competitive prices (the prices that
clear the market). They, as in almost all the static Bertrand-Edgeworth models, have to make an
assumption on spill, and their results are assuming proportional rationing.
Notice that with dynamic competition one does not need to specify the rationing rule as each
customer is modeled individually as choosing the lowest priced product in that period, side-stepping
one of the problems with static price competition|the non-robustness of the results when one
considers a di®erent rationing rule as that of [23]. Of course, the order in which the customers are
assumed to arrive (even if this is stochastic) is in some way a rationing rule, but (i) one has some
physical evidence that customers do come in a certain way (say Poisson; or, in the RM context,
business customers closer to departure) and one can hopefully test the assumptions empirically, and
(ii) if we assume that all customers have the same valuation, rationing does not matter, making our
conclusions more robust.
Dudey [13] considers the equivalent of the Kreps and Scheinkman [23] game|capacity choice and
23then pricing|for his model, where the second-stage game is a dynamic pricing game, and shows that
this two-stage game has equilibria: if M is odd, then the ¯rms choose M+1
2 ; M¡1
2 in any equilibrium,
and if M is even, both ¯rms choose M
2 , and all consumers pay the monopoly price. While equilibrium
exists, its nature is qualitatively di®erent than the one in Kreps and Scheinkman [23], where Cournot
outcomes result, with prices well below monopoly prices.
In contrast, when we add uncertainty to the market size, we ¯nd that an equilibrium for the
capacity choice can fail to exist, see Figure 8, a fact widely observed in the literature of the two-stage
games ([22], [21]).




























(capacity cost=0.1/unit; market size mean = 30)
Figure 8: Capacity best-response functions, for a capacity cost of 0.1/unit and an average market
size equal to 30.
6 Conclusions and Further Research
In this paper, we study dynamic price competition between two ¯rms with ¯xed capacities that
compete to satisfy a stochastic demand that arrives over time. We show that subgame-perfect equi-
librium exists and is unique. The equilibrium pricing can be characterized by a simple \competitive
bid-price" type of rule: each ¯rm calculates a competitive (equilibrium) reservation value, and in
each period, the ¯rm with the lower reservation value makes the sale at a price equal to the other
¯rm's reservation value. In addition, we show that in equilibrium the lower-capacity ¯rm will always
sell its entire capacity before the competitor starts selling at all. As a result, the lower-capacity
¯rm generates its pro¯ts by selling its units with higher probability, but at a lower price (because
it must reduce its price to be able to sell the capacity). The higher-capacity ¯rm, on the other
hand, sells its units with lower probability, but at the highest price, since by the time it sells, the
competitor has exhausted its capacity. Lower prices arise purely out of competitive forces, and not
for price-discrimination purposes. On the other hand, the prices are not as low as predicted by the
static Bertrand game in equilibrium.
24We then extend the basic model to non-zero capacity costs and non-stationary customer valua-
tions. We ¯nd that our results are robust provided that customer valuations are non-increasing over
time, in which case, equilibrium may not be unique anymore. We also extend the model to more
than two ¯rms.
The existence and uniqueness result allows us to provide some insights into the nature of compe-
tition. We investigate the evolution of equilibrium prices and the corresponding equilibrium pro¯ts.
We highlight how the capacity split between ¯rms and the market to capacity ratio a®ect prices and
pro¯ts. Finally, we consider the capacity choice decision and ¯nd that there may be no pure-strategy
equilibrium with uncertain market sizes.
While stylized, the model gives managers insight into dynamic pricing competition with limited
capacities, and the role of capacities in determining the degree of competition. The simple decision
rule identi¯ed in the paper considers competitor's pricing reactions, one of the features that is
missing in most RM implementations. Finally, the model can also be used to evaluate capacity
entry decisions, speci¯cally how the capacity decision interacts with subsequent price competition.
The model opens a number of research questions for further study. For example, we identi¯ed
that the assumptions regarding customer valuations (and how these evolve over time) are critical for
the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. It would thus be interesting to explore what dynamic
pricing strategies are appropriate under competition when customer valuation increases over time.
This is especially relevant for the airline industry, where customers arriving late tend to be business
customers willing to pay more for a seat. In addition, it is also worth studying how the results
identi¯ed in this paper change when customers have unknown valuations, i.e., when the probability
of selling a unit is decreasing in the price quoted. This model also re°ects the behavior of price-
sensitive customers.
Our model assumes that capacities are observable, and later argues that they can be inferred
perfectly from the price path. However, when one cannot guarantee a unique equilibrium, then what
one can observe and infer determines a ¯rm's best response. Operationally, this is one of the critical
research questions that has to be resolved before one can make these economic and game theory
concepts implementable for operational use.
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27Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof
If xA > 0;xB > 0, if pB > v, it is clear that A should price at v, because this is the highest it will







pA + V ¦
A(xA ¡ 1;xB; ~ It+1)
´
+PB(pA;pB)V ¦
A(xA;xB ¡ 1; ~ It+1)jIt; ~ SIt = 1
i
Firm A is better o® pricing pA < pB if pB + E[V ¦
A(xA ¡ 1;xB; ~ It+1)] > E[V ¦
A(xA;xB ¡ 1; ~ It+1))]
(conditional expectation). Thus, the best-response of A is to price slightly below pB, until the reser-
vation price 4V ¦
A(xA;xB;It) is reached. The same is true for B. As a result, the sellers engage in
Bertrand price competition and the equilibrium is well-known to be that the seller with the lowest
reservation price sells a unit, at the highest reservation price. Q.E.D
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof
The recursion is immediate after applying the structure in equilibrium, derived in Lemma 1, into
Equation (1). In the case where xA > 0;xB > 0, we use the fact that both 4V ¦
A(xA;xB;It) and
4V ¦
B(xA;xB;It) must be smaller than v, since if a ¯rm's competitor picks a price larger than v, it
is always in the ¯rm's interest to set the price at v. Thus, its reservation value must be lower. Q.E.D
Proof of Theorem 1
Proof
First, Lemmas 1 and 2 show that, if equilibrium exists, it is unique. In addition, since the value func-
tions are well-de¯ned, existence follows from the existence of equilibrium in asymmetric Bertrand
competition, established in Lemma 1. Q.E.D
Proof of Lemma 3
Proof
The transformation of V ¦
A;V ¦
B is direct from Equations (4) and (5). Q.E.D
28Proof of Lemma 4
Proof
We show the result by induction, for t = T;T ¡ 1;:::, for all values of It;x;y.
At t = T + 1, it is clearly true since W(¢;¢;IT+1) = 0.
Assume that the expressions in the lemma are true for t + 1, i.e.
² if 0 · x < y, W(x;y;It+1) = vxPr
h
















If x = 0, we solve the monopoly case, where the value function is clearly W(0;y;It) = vE[minfy; ~ RItgjIt].
Consider 1 · x < y. In that case, we have that










































W(x;y ¡ 1;It+1) ¡ W(x ¡ 1;y;It+1)
· vxPr
h





¡ v(x ¡ 1)Pr
h





where the inequality is applied in the case x = y ¡ 1;
= vxPr
h






























· W(y;x ¡ 1;It+1) ¡ W(y ¡ 1;x;It+1)
As a result, the ¯rm with higher capacity y sets the reservation value, equal to
E~ It+1
n
W(y;x ¡ 1; ~ It+1) ¡ W(y ¡ 1;x; ~ It+1)
¯ ¯
¯It; ~ SIt = 1
o
:
















+ v(x ¡ 1)Pr
h















~ RIt+1 ¸ x + 1
¯
¯










~ RIt+1 + ~ SIt ¸ x + 1
¯










~ RIt+1 + ~ SIt ¸ x + 1
¯






















~ RIt+1 ¡ (x ¡ 1)
´+¾¯ ¯














~ RIt+1 ¡ x
´+¾¯













Finally, if x = y, both sellers have the same reservation price, and hence the value function can be














This concludes the induction. Q.E.D
Proof of Theorem 2
Proof
When sellers have di®erent capacities, the selling price is given by the ¯rm with higher capacity.
This is given by the case x < y, from the previous proof:
E~ It+1
n
W(y;x ¡ 1; ~ It+1) ¡ W(y ¡ 1;x; ~ It+1)
¯ ¯














~ RIt+1 ¸ x
¯
¯
¯It; ~ SIt = 1
i
When both ¯rms have the same capacity, the case corresponds to x = y,

































~ RIt+1 ¡ x + 1
´+¾












x; ~ RIt+1 ¡ x + 1
o


















30Proof of Theorem 3
Proof












pA ¡ cA + E~ It+1
h
V ¦
A(xA ¡ 1;xB; ~ It+1)
¯





A(xA;xB ¡ 1; ~ It+1)
¯






















¯It; ~ SIt = 0
i
(9)
and similarly for B.
Given pB, letting ² > 0 and small, the best price set by A is
pA =
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > :
vIt ¡ ²
if pB ¸ vIt and vIt ¸ cA + E~ It+1
h
V ¦
A(xA;xB; ~ It+1) ¡ V ¦
A(xA ¡ 1;xB; ~ It+1)
¯ ¯
¯It; ~ SIt = 1
i
cA + E~ It+1
h
V ¦
A(xA;xB; ~ It+1) ¡ V ¦
A(xA ¡ 1;xB; ~ It+1)
¯ ¯
¯It; ~ SIt = 1
i
if pB ¸ vIt and vIt · cA + E~ It+1
h
V ¦
A(xA;xB; ~ It+1) ¡ V ¦
A(xA ¡ 1;xB; ~ It+1)
¯
¯
¯It; ~ SIt = 1
i
pB ¡ ²
if pB · vIt and pB ¸ cA + E~ It+1
h
V ¦
A(xA;xB ¡ 1; ~ It+1) ¡ V ¦
A(xA ¡ 1;xB; ~ It+1)
¯ ¯
¯It; ~ SIt = 1
i
cA + E~ It+1
h
V ¦
A(xA;xB ¡ 1; ~ It+1) ¡ V ¦
A(xA ¡ 1;xB; ~ It+1)
¯ ¯
¯It; ~ SIt = 1
i
if pB · vIt and pB · cA + E~ It+1
h
V ¦
A(xA;xB ¡ 1; ~ It+1) ¡ V ¦
A(xA ¡ 1;xB; ~ It+1)
¯
¯
¯It; ~ SIt = 1
i
Clearly, since the best possible future per-unit pro¯t that A can obtain is at most vIt ¡ cA, A
will always try to sell a unit at t if pB ¸ vIt, since vIt ¡ cA ¸ E~ It+1
h
V ¦




¯ ¯It; ~ SIt = 1
i




A(xA;xB ¡ 1; ~ It+1) ¡ V ¦
A(xA ¡ 1;xB; ~ It+1)
¯ ¯
¯It; ~ SIt = 1
i
and the fourth case never occurs
either when pB is slightly below vIt. As a result, the best-response is continuous in pB and the sellers
engage in asymmetric Bertrand price competition with reservation prices minfvIt;4V ¦
A(xA;xB;It)g
for A and minfvIt;4V ¦
B(xA;xB;It)g for B, where
4V ¦
A(xA;xB;It) = E~ It+1
h
cA + V ¦
A(xA;xB ¡ 1; ~ It+1) ¡ V ¦
A(xA ¡ 1;xB; ~ It+1)
¯ ¯





B(xA;xB;It) = E~ It+1
h
cB + V ¦
B(xA ¡ 1;xB; ~ It+1) ¡ V ¦
B(xA;xB ¡ 1; ~ It+1)
¯ ¯
¯It; ~ SIt = 1
i
:
This extends Lemma 1 to this setting. As a result, the value function recursion of any equilibrium
is given by the joint recursion V ¦
A(¢;¢;IT+1) = V ¦





> > > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > :
0 if xA = 0
Pr(~ SIt = 1jIt)
³
vIt ¡ cA + E~ It+1
h
V ¦
A(xA ¡ 1;0; ~ It+1)
¯
¯
¯It; ~ SIt = 1
i´





¯ ¯It; ~ SIt = 0
i
if xA > 0;xB = 0





A(xA ¡ 1;xB; ~ It+1)
¯




















> > > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > :
0 if xB = 0
Pr(~ SIt = 1jIt)
³
vIt ¡ cB + E~ It+1
h
V ¦
A(0;xB ¡ 1; ~ It+1)
¯
¯ ¯It; ~ SIt = 1
i´





¯ ¯It; ~ SIt = 0
i
if xB > 0;xA = 0





B(xA;xB ¡ 1; ~ It+1)
¯















Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium follow.
Q.E.D
Proof of Theorem 4
Proof





µ if xA ¸ 1;xB = 0
0 otherwise
where µ = Pr(SI1 = 1jI0), and similarly for B. Consider the game in period t = 0 with xA = xB = 1
with v < µ. If pB > v, then A will set pA = v because it does not sell at t = 0, then it will make
zero pro¯t. If pB · v, then B will set pA > pB and let B sell. As a result, there are two equilibria:
pA = v and pB > v, and pB = v and pA > v.
Q.E.D
32Proof of Theorem 5
Proof
In order to prove the theorem, we show by backwards induction that for all t = T;:::;1, for all
It+1, a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium exists starting from state It+1. The equilibrium results
in value functions as follows. Let x = maxjfxjg. If xi < xmax then
Vi(x;It+1) = vxiPr
2































It is clear that the property is true for t = T, because ~ RIt+1 = 0 and Vi(x;IT+1) = 0.
Assume that the property is true for all states It+1, and consider the pricing game starting from
a state It. Without loss of generality, assume that x1 · ::: · xm¡1 < xmax and xm = ::: = xn =
xmax. For this purpose, we let It+1 = (It; ~ SIt = 1) and calculate the reservation values of each ¯rm.
We have two cases to consider: when m = n (only one ¯rm has maximum capacity) and m < n (at
least two have maximum capacity).
First, if m = n,
² if i;k < m, then
Vi(x ¡ ek;It+1) ¡ Vi(x ¡ ei;It+1)
= vxiPr
2







5 ¡ v(xi ¡ 1)Pr
2


















² if i < m and k = m and xi = xk ¡ 1 = xmax ¡ 1, then





















5 ¡ v(xi ¡ 1)Pr
2


















33² if i < m and k = m and xi < xk ¡ 1 = xmax ¡ 1, then
Vi(x ¡ ek;It+1) ¡ Vi(x ¡ ei;It+1)
= vxiPr
2







5 ¡ v(xi ¡ 1)Pr
2


















² if i = m and k < m, then





















































In this scenario, the equilibrium is that all ¯rms set a price equal to vPr
2








and the customer (if it arrives) is served by a ¯rm k < m. Indeed, this is the reservation value of
all ¯rms if k < m. On the other hand, if the winner is k = m, then the rest of the ¯rms would be
willing to undercut its price. In addition, all other prices are either above or below the reservation
value and hence cannot be an equilibrium.
On the other hand, if k < m (at least two ¯rms have maximum capacity),
² if i;k < m, then
Vi(x ¡ ek;It+1) ¡ Vi(x ¡ ei;It+1)
= vPr
2








² if i < m and k ¸ m, then
Vi(x ¡ ek;It+1) ¡ Vi(x ¡ ei;It+1)
= vxiPr
2







5 ¡ v(xi ¡ 1)Pr
2


















34² if i ¸ m, then









@ ~ RIt+1 ¡
X
j




















































5 ¡ v(xi ¡ 1)Pr
2



























5 and sells to the customer.
As a result, in both cases, the price strategy equilibrium is unique (although the winners are
selected randomly). The resulting value functions are thus uniquely de¯ned. If xi = xmax and ¯rm
k sells to the customer,
Vi(x;It) = Pr[~ SIt = 1jIt]E~ It+1
h
Vi(x ¡ ek; ~ It+1)jIt; ~ SIt = 1
i
+Pr[~ SIt = 0jIt]E~ It+1
h
Vi(x; ~ It+1)jIt; ~ SIt = 0
i



















¯It; ~ SIt = 1
3
5












































If xi < xmax (this is calculated assuming that there is only one ¯rm with capacity xmax; the identical
35result is derived when more than one has capacity xmax)









5 + Vi(x ¡ ei; ~ It+1)
¯
¯ ¯It; ~ SIt = 1
3
5
+Pr[~ SIt = 0jIt]E~ It+1
h
Vi(x; ~ It+1)jIt; ~ SIt = 0
i











¯It; ~ SIt = 1
3
5




4 ~ RIt+1 ¸
X
j
xj ¡ xmax + 1
3





4 ~ Rt ¸
X
j





This completes the induction.
Q.E.D
Proof of Theorem 6
Proof
Let xmax = max
j
xj and M = fijxi = xmaxg. Thus, from the previous proof,
Vindustry(x;It)
v


















~ Rt ¡ n + xmax
´+¾














This expression is decreasing in jMj. It is also increasing in xmax because, when ~ Rt ¸ n¡xmax +1,
n + jMjmin
n
0; ~ Rt ¡ n
o
¸ n ¡ jMj(xmax ¡ 1) ¸ 0 (recall that jMjxmax · n). The bounds are
derived by setting jMj = 1 and xmax = n, and jMj = n and xmax = 1. Q.E.D
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